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Supreme Court Makes it Easier to Sue Under Title VII for Job Transfers

By: Paul A. Testa, Esq.

On April 17, 2024, the U.S. Supreme Court made it easier for employees to sue for a discriminatory job transfer under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  The result of this decision could lead to an increase in workplace discrimination suits.

In Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, et al., the plaintiff Jatonya Clayborn Muldrow, a St. Louis Police Sergeant, claimed that her employer, the St. Louis Police Department, transferred her to a new position because she is a woman. Despite Muldrow not losing any pay or rank, she alleged that the unwanted transfer resulted in a change in her schedule and responsibilities, the loss of a take-home car, and hampered her career prospects.

The District Court found in favor of the employer, explaining that Muldrow “needed to show that her transfer effected a ‘significant’ change in working conditions producing ‘material employment disadvantage.’” 2020 WL 5505113, *8–*9. The District Court held that Muldrow could not meet this standard as “[S]he experienced no change in salary or rank; Her loss of the networking [opportunities] available in Intelligence was immaterial because she had not provided evidence that it had harmed her ‘career prospects;’ And given her continued supervisory role, she had not suffered a significant alteration to her work responsibilities.” Id. at *9 (internal quotations omitted).

The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the decision, holding that “Muldrow had to—but could not—show that the transfer caused a “materially significant disadvantage.”  As was the case with the District Court, the Eighth Circuit seemed to zero in on the fact that Muldrow’s transfer “did not result in a diminution to her title, salary, or benefits.”

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to “resolve a Circuit split over whether an employee challenging a transfer under Title VII must meet a heightened threshold of harm—be it dubbed significant, serious, or something similar.”

The Supreme Court ultimately reversed the decision, finding that “To make out a Title VII discrimination claim, a transferee must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment. What the transferee does not have to show, according to the relevant text, is that the harm incurred was significant . . . Or serious, or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must exceed a heightened bar.” (emphasis added).

Indeed, the Supreme Court found that Muldrow only needed to show “some injury respecting her employment terms or conditions. The transfer must have left her worse off, but need not have left her significantly so.”

This decision is important to Connecticut employers and other employers in the Second Circuit.  The current standard in the Second Circuit regarding an involuntary transfer is similar to the Eighth Circuit – in the Second Circuit, “an involuntary transfer may constitute an adverse employment action if the plaintiff shows that the transfer created a materially significant disadvantage” with respect to an employee’s terms and conditions of employment. Flieger v. E. Suffolk BOCES, 693 Fed. Appx. 14, 17 (2d Cir. 2017) (emphasis added).  Similarly, Connecticut courts hold that a transfer is an adverse employment action if it results in a change of responsibilities so significant as to constitute a setback to the plaintiff’s career . . . The key . . . is that the plaintiff must show that the transfer created a materially significant disadvantage.” Cruz v. City of New Haven, 2019 Conn. Super. LEXIS 3410, at *28 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 19, 2019) (emphasis added).

With the new lower standard announced by the Supreme Court, Connecticut employers are now exposed to potentially more lawsuits over transfers that result in no change to the employee’s title, salary, or benefits. Rather, the employee need only show that the transfer “left her worse off.”

Of course, if a Connecticut employer transfers an employee for a discriminatory purpose, that is undoubtedly a violation of the law.  The issue now with this lower standard is that even if an employer transfers an employee based on legitimate business needs or demands, they still may run afoul of the law, as the employee need only show that the transfer left him or her worse off. But if an employer involuntarily transfers an employee for legitimate business reasons, even if the transferee is left worse off, the employer does not run afoul of the law unless discrimination in violation of Title VII was also a motivating factor.

Connecticut Employers need to be mindful of this lower standard when making future transfer decisions. It is always a good practice to focus on the potential impact of any employment decision before it is made; rather than after the fact.  While focusing on the effects of any employment decision upfront may not prevent every claim, it will put your Company in the best position to prevail if an employee or former employee brings legal action.